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FOREWORD
The Latinobarometric Polls underline the fact that
even though most Latin American countries’ Gross
Domestic Products (GDP) have been improving since
2001, there are deep flaws in the political-economicsocial systems throughout the region. Popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic and
political inequalities, general distrust of most national
institutions, and a specific lack of confidence in the
police, the legislatures, and the political parties. There
are also rising popular expectations regarding currently nonexistent rights. Consequently, Latin America, as it did in 1960-90, appears to be a revolutionary,
insurgent, criminal, and populist dream. Thus, the
Americas appear to be particularly susceptible to state
(and their proxies) and nonstate actors that promise
the security, stability, and prosperity national governments have generally failed to provide. Accordingly,
Venezuela and President Hugo Chavez have become
exporters of asymmetric, unconventional, and undeclared war. If left ignored and unchecked, these wars
compel radical, unwanted, and epochal political-economic-social system change.
Even though prudent governments must prepare
for high-risk, low-probability, conventional interstate
war, there is a high probability that the President of
the United States, the Congress, and leaders of other
powers around the world will continue to require
civil-military participation in unconventional conflicts
well into the future. Additionally, the spillover effects
of intranational and transnational nonstate actor destabilization efforts and the resultant internal violence
place demands on the global community—if not to
solve the underlying problems or control the violence,
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then at least to harbor the living victims. This does not
mean that the United States must be involved all over
the world all the time. It does mean, however, that the
United States must rethink and renew its concept of security. In much the same way that George F. Kennan’s
containment theory of engagement was conceived in
1947, philosophical underpinnings must be devised
for a new theory of engagement to deal with more
diverse threats from unpredictable directions, and by
more diverse state and nonstate actors modeled on
Chavez’s concept of 4th Generation War between the
weak and the strong. The logic of this situation demonstrates that the conscious choices that individual
nation-states and the international community make
about how to deal with this type of unconventional
threat will define the processes of national, regional,
and global security and well-being for now and the
future. It is past time for the United States to begin
the process of developing an acceptable response to
Chavez’s “new” security reality.
This monograph comes at a time when there are
well over 100 ongoing small, unconventional, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars in which hegemonic
states and their proxies and violent nonstate actors
are helping their own organizations or political patrons bring about radical change and acquire putative
power. Accordingly, the author of this monograph,
Dr. Max Manwaring, examines a cogent case that illustrates how would-be revolutionaries all around the
world might seek to realize their dreams. They would
include populists and neo-populists; the New Left,
New Socialists, and 21st Century Socialists; criminal
nonstate actors, agitators, gangs, and popular militias;
and other “modern mercenaries.” The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part
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of its continuing effort to inform the security debate,
and to help strategic leaders better understand the realities of modern asymmetric war.
			

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Almost no one seems to understand the MarxistLeninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political
thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general
vision of his “Bolivarian Revolution.” The abbreviated
concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S.
dominated) political and economic systems in the
Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the
Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion
of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely
separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any
bourgeois opposition, Chavez’s revolutionary vision
will not be achieved through a conventional military
war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will only be created by a gradual, systematic,
compulsory application of agitation and propaganda
(i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion
in favor of a “revolution” and against the bourgeois
system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that
the North American (U.S.) “Empire” and its bourgeois
political friends in Latin America are not doing what
is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian
philosophy and leadership will.
In these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public opinion that is the main target
of the revolutionary effort. Chavez’s vision comes
at a time when, despite general economic progress,
there are deep flaws in the democratic political systems throughout the Western Hemisphere. Relative
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popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities; distrust; and lack of confidence
in the police, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along
with a popular consciousness of currently nonexistent
rights. Latin America, now—as in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s—appears to be a revolutionary’s dream.
Thus, it appears that Hugo Chavez is prepared to help
friends, partners, and allies to destabilize, to facilitate
the processes of state failure, and to “destroy in order
to build” in true revolutionary fashion. Moreover, according to Chavez, it does not matter whether or not he
will be able to continue to direct that effort. He states
straightforwardly that “. . . independent of my personal destiny, this revolution . . . has gotten its start, and
nothing and no one can stop it.” Consequently, this
monograph will address four cogent issues operating
within the context of President Chavez’s grand strategic political-psychological destabilization effort. They
are: 1) Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Vision; 2) Key Components of the Chavez Strategic-Level Asymmetric
(4th Generation War) War Model; 3) The Paramilitary
Operational Model for Compelling Radical Change
in the Western Hemisphere; and, 4) Implications and
Recommendations.
The kind of warfare outlined implicitly and explicitly above represents a triple threat to the authority,
legitimacy, and stability of targeted governments: 1) it
undermines the ability to perform legitimizing security and well-being functions; 2) it replaces traditional
nation-state authority (sovereignty) with alternative
governance; and, 3) it conducts low-cost actions calculated to move a state into the state failure process. The
logic of this situation demonstrates that the conscious
choices that individual nation-states and the interna-
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tional community make about how to deal with these
kinds of threats will define the processes of national, regional, and global security and well-being now and for
the future. Accordingly, we must adapt our approach
to security and organize our institutions to address
the concept of contemporary asymmetric, unconventional, undeclared intrastate war (i.e., 4th Generation
War). We must also adapt our approach to the overwhelming reality that just as the world has evolved
from an industrial society to an information-based
society, so has warfare. The reality of this evolution
demonstrates the need for a new paradigm of conflict
based on the fact that information—not firepower—is
the currency upon which war is now conducted. The
new primary center of gravity is public opinion and
political leadership. The “new” instruments of power
are intelligence, public diplomacy, media, time, and
flexibility. The one thing that remains the same is that
one level or another of compulsion still defines war.
Hugo Chavez and his selected leadership understand that contemporary asymmetric war is not a kind
of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more
comfortable conventional military attrition warfare
paradigms. It is a great deal more. This takes us back
to where we began. Chavez and his supporters understand the importance of dreams about the survival
and a better life for much of any given population.
These are the bases of power—all else is illusion. This
may not be a traditional national security problem for
the United States and other targeted countries, and it
may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional
conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality
of compulsion.
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VENEZUELA AS AN EXPORTER OF
4TH GENERATION WARFARE INSTABILITY
The past several years have marked the beginning
of a different security era than that to which we are
accustomed. Accordingly, this era requires a new orientation. Whether we like it or not, whether we want
it or not, and whether we are prepared for it or not, the
United States and the West are engaged in a number
of unconventional, undeclared, and undefined asymmetric wars. If left ignored and unchecked, these wars
compel radical, unwanted, and epochal political-economic-social change. Even if that compulsion is generally indirect, ambiguous, conducted over long periods
of time, and not perceived to be as lethal as land conventional maneuver war, that does not alter the cruel
reality of the compulsion.1
Since his election as the President of Venezuela in
1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to
encourage his Venezuelan, Latin American, Russian,
and Iranian partners to support an undeclared asymmetric war paradigm designed to put an end to U.S.
political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere and to transform the whole of Latin America
into a single Bolivarian (Socialist) state. Chavez’s
model centers on a three-front asymmetric war that
is: 1) psychological-political; 2) uses combinations of
asymmetric ways and means to achieve its ends; and,
3) is deliberately protracted. In addition to Asymmetric War, Chavez calls this type of conflict 4th Generation War (4GW).2
Whether or not Chavez can deliver on his threefront 21st-century transition program is really not all
that important. This is not because this is the rhetoric
of a “nut case,” a “clown,” or even a “dead man” im-
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mersed in “political theater.” This is, importantly, the
rhetoric of an astute warrior who understands asymmetric war and who is performing the traditional and
universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and operational plan for a successful revolutionary conflict. Most importantly, Hugo Chavez’s
Bolivarian dream has stirred the imaginations of
many Latin American and other interested observers
around the world. He has provided a seductive Leninist blueprint for a utopian future. Anyone can take
it, adapt it for his own use, and use it anywhere in
the world to bring about radical political, economic,
and social change. Thus, it appears that Chavez is
prepared to help friends, partners, and allies to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of state failure, and
to “destroy in order to build” in true revolutionary
fashion.3 Moreover, according to Chavez, it does not
matter whether or not he will be able to continue to
direct that effort. He states straightforwardly that
“. . . independent of my personal destiny, this revolution . . . has gotten its start, and nothing and no one
can stop it.”4
To help strategic leaders—and anyone else who
has the responsibility for dealing with, analyzing,
planning, implementing, and/or reporting on contemporary security threats--understand this phenomenon, this monograph will address four cogent issues
relevant to the context of President Chavez’s grand
strategic political-psychological destabilization effort.
They are: 1) Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Vision; 2) Key
Components of the Chavez Strategic-Level Asymmetric Warfare Model; 3) The Paramilitary Operational
Model for Compelling Radical Change in the Western
Hemisphere; and, 4) Implications and Recommendations. Lastly, this would be a good point from which
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military and civilian leaders might start thinking about
all the asymmetric wars that the United States and its
allies face now and will continue to face in the future.
HUGO CHAVEZ’S BOLIVARIAN VISION AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE IT
Almost no one seems to understand the MarxistLeninist foundations of Hugo Chavez’s political
thought. It becomes evident, however, in his general
vision of the Bolivarian Revolution. The abbreviated
concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S.dominated) political and economic systems in the
Americas, to take power, and to create a socialistic, nationalistic, and “popular” (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout
the Americas.5 Despite the fact that the possible use of
military force is never completely separated from the
Leninist concept of destroying bourgeois opposition,
Chavez’s revolutionary vision will not be achieved
through a conventional military war of maneuver and
attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to
Vladimir Lenin and Chavez, a “new society” will be
created only by a gradual and systematic application
of agitation and propaganda. That long-term effort is
aimed at exporting instability and generating public
opinion in favor of the “revolution” and against the
bourgeois system.6 Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the
concept that the North American “Empire” and its
bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not
doing what is right for the people and that the socialist
Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will.
In these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public opinion that is the main target of
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the revolutionary effort. Chavez’s vision comes at a
time when, despite general economic progress, there
are deep flaws in the democratic political systems
throughout the Western Hemisphere. The relative
popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities, distrust and lack of confidence
in the police, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along
with a popular consciousness of nonexistent rights.7
The apparent waning of U.S. power has opened the
possibility of a new global geopolitical order. At the
same time, the worldwide financial crisis and the rise
of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
have shaken the conventional wisdom that capitalism
and liberal democracy are superior to the alternatives.8
Latin America now—as in the 1960s and 1970s—appears to be a revolutionary’s dream.
Five Enabling Concepts.
Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian strategic-level dream
depends on five enabling concepts. It begins with the
premise that traditional post-World War II socialist
and Marxist-Leninist political-economic models made
mistakes, but the theory remains valid. The idea is
that representative democracy and the U.S.-dominated capitalism of the new global era are total failures.
Representative democracy and capitalism serve only
elites—not the common people. These failures must
now be replaced by “participatory democracy,” “direct democracy,” or what some detractors have called
“radical” or “neo-populism.” In these terms, Chavez
is: 1) re-elaborating a Rousseauan concept of “direct”
or “totalitarian”democracy; and, 2) promoting a socialist economic system as two parts of a five-part over-
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arching political-economic model for Latin America.9
The other three parts of the model include: 3) a new
security scheme for Venezuala; 4) social programs to
strengthen “direct democracy” and its internal power
base; and, 5) maximum communications support to
the regime. That overall system of power is intended to ensure internal peace and societal harmony in
Venezuela that will—in time—provide the foundations for a Hemisphere-wide regional power bloc, and
socioeconomic and political integration. 10
Direct Democracy and the Socialist Economic System.
The current concept of Venezuelan democracy has its
roots firmly in the French Revolution and subsequent
perversions of the Rousseauan notion of “total” (totalitarian) democracy. In this scenario, the individual
surrenders his rights and personal interests to the
state in return for the enforcement of social harmony
and the General Will. Prior to the French Revolution,
kings ruled by “Divine Right” and were sovereign.
With the revolution, however, sovereignty was shifted from the king to the nation-state. Thus, the state
enjoys absolute power (de facto sovereignty)—through
the enforcement of Rousseau’s General Will—as an essential right. 11
The main tenets of direct democracy in contemporary Venezuela dictate that: 1) the new authority in the
state must be a maximum leader who communicates
directly with the people, interprets their needs, and
emphasizes “social expenditure” to guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people; 2) elections,
Congress, and the courts will provide formal democracy and international legitimacy (de jure sovereignty),
but will have no real role in governance or the economy; 3) the state will control or own the major means of
national economic production and distribution; and,
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4) the national and regional political-economic integration function will be performed by the supreme
leader by means of his regional financial, material, informational, and political-military support of radical
populist and 21st-century social movements.12
The Security Scheme. Lacking the conventional
power to challenge the United States or most of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, President Chavez and
his followers know that asymmetric conflict is a logical
means of expression and self-assertion. It is a concept
as old as war itself, a methodology of the weak against
the strong. The primary characteristic of asymmetric
conflict is the use of disparity between contending
parties to gain advantage. Strategic asymmetry has
been defined as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s
own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses,
attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action
and movement. It can have both psychological as well
as physical dimensions.”13 Chavez’s concept of asymmetric war makes explicit the need to generate a mix
of unconventional methods that authoritatively integrates a nation-state’s political, economic, social-moral, informational, and military instruments of power.
This type of conflict is not won by seizing specific
territory militarily or destroying specific industrial
or nuclear capabilities. It is won by altering the political-psychological-economic-social factors that are
most relevant in a targeted culture. But, like all others, this kind of conflict is intended to resist, oppose,
gain control of, or overthrow an existing government
or symbol of power—and bring about radical political change. All this requires a complete unity of effort
by the state, using the multidimensional instruments
of national and international (alliances and partnerships) power that it has at its disposal.14
6

Thus, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides political and institutional autonomy for the
armed forces, under the absolute control of the President and commander in chief. President Chavez has
also created an independent national police force, outside the traditional control of the armed forces, which
is directly responsible to the President. At the same
time, efforts have gone forward to establish a one
million-person military reserve and two additional
paramilitary organizations—the Frente Bolivariano de
Liberacion (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms).
The armed forces and the police perform traditional
national defense and internal security missions within
the context of preparing for what President Chavez
has called a “4th Generation Asymmetric War of All
the People.”15 The military reserve and the paramilitary (militia) organizations are charged to: 1) protect
the country from a U.S. or Colombian invasion with
an Iraqi-style insurgency; 2) act internally as armed,
anti-opposition militias; and, 3) act internationally as
armed anti-bourgeois militias.16 The institutional separation of the various security organizations ensures
that no one security institution can control the others,
but the centralization of those institutions under the
control of the President ensures his absolute control
of security and “social harmony” in Venezuela—and
elsewhere.17
Social Programs and Communications. To strengthen
his personal position and internal power base, President Chavez is spending large amounts of money on
an amorphous Plan Bolivar 2000 for the building and
renovation of schools, clinics, day nurseries, roads, and
housing for the poor. Additionally, the President is
developing education and literacy outreach programs,
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agrarian reform programs, and workers’ cooperatives.
At the same time, he has established MERCAL, a state
company that provides subsidized foodstuffs to the
poor. Chavez has also imported 16,000 Cuban doctors
to help take care of the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclass. Clearly, these social programs offer
tangible benefits to the mass of voting Venezuelans
who were generally ignored or neglected by previous
governments.18
The intent of the communications and informational efforts is to generate strong and favorable public opinion. Thus, Bolivarianismo requires maximum
media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop mass consensus, and
generate electoral successes. Ample evidence exists
that Chavez-controlled media are using emotional
arguments to gain attention, to exploit real and imagined fears of the population, to create outside enemies
as scapegoats for internal failures, and to inculcate
the notion that opposition to the regime equates to
betrayal of the country. President Chavez’s personal
involvement in the communications effort is also clear
and strong. Statements, speeches, and interviews are
being broadcast throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean
Basin, and large parts of Central and South America every day on the state-owned Television del Sur.
Additionally, Iranian TV (Hispan TV) is now broadcasting in Spanish 24 hours a day throughout all of
Latin America.19
Conclusions.
All these programs together provide the President of Venezuela—whoever he might be—with the
architecture to generate a unity of effort among the
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various political-psychological-socioeconomic-informational-military instruments of state power. That
unifying structure, rather than traditional governmental hierarchy, allows the President a vastly more
effective and efficient means through which to pursue
his political-strategic Bolivarian objectives. At a minimum, Hugo Chavez has created the elements that can
make Venezuela a regional power. He or his successor can easily export direct democracy, oil money,
socialist propaganda, and military assets to friendly
governments, radical groups, and insurgents all over
the Hemisphere. In these terms, Chavez is also developing the capability to destabilize and force a radical
restructuring of specific bourgeois political-economic
systems over large parts of the Americas.20 But, instability is only a symptom, not the threat. Instability is
the starting point from which to understand the second-, third-, and fourth-level effects that shape the
Latin American security environment now and for the
future. Instability also defines the ultimate security
threat for now and the future—that is, the threat that
no one likes to talk about—the export of economic and
political instability to foment the state failure process.
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE CHAVEZ
STRATEGIC-LEVEL ASYMMETRIC
WARFARE MODEL
This type of conflict is primarily psychologicalpolitical and aimed at human terrain rather than geographical territory. As a consequence, the new primary
center of gravity (the hub of all power and movement)
is not military. It is public opinion and leadership.21
This kind of conflict is based on perceptions, beliefs,
expectations, and dreams. The key components of
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Chavez’s strategic-level asymmetric warfare model
can be understood within the context of a deliberate
three-front grand strategic conflict that: 1) is primarily
psychological-political; 2) uses combinations of military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, and direct
and indirect ways and means to accomplish its ends;
and, 3) is deliberately protracted (temporal).22
Psychological-Political War.
The term “propaganda” connotes the dissemination or promotion of ideas, doctrine, and practices to
further one’s cause or damage the opposition’s cause.
Most commonly, the term is used pejoratively to imply deception or distortion of the truth. Lenin and
Chavez use the term in both senses. Because it is as
important to protect one’s own centers of gravity as
it is to attack the enemy’s, the intent is to indirectly
and directly alter the political-psychological factors
that are most relevant to one’s own and targeted cultures. That is, to spread “a proper understanding of
the present social and economic system . . . [and] an
understanding of the historical task of international
Social-Democracy” (21st-Century Socialism).23 Inseparably connected with propaganda is agitation. Agitation means that small groups of individuals foment
and take part in the various coercive manifestations
of the revolution and “all the conflicts between workers and the capitalists.”24 Moreover, there is no issue
in the political field that does not serve as a subject
for political agitation.” As a consequence, according
to Lenin, small propaganda-agitator organizations
(“agi-props”) must be organized, trained, and utilized
to support the political-psychological struggle and to
act as the “midwives” of new social orders.25 Together,
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propaganda and agitation will generate political-psychological-economic-social-military support for the
whole revolutionary organization and for its immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives.26
The primary and specific effort, however, that ultimately breaks up and defeats an adversary’s politicaleconomic-social system and compels radical change
is the multidimensional erosion of people’s morale
and political will.27 The better one protagonist is at
that persuasive-coercive (agi-prop) effort, the more
effective that protagonist will be relative to the opposition.28 Accordingly, as noted above, the center of
gravity is an adversary’s public opinion and political
decisionmaking leadership.29 The basic reality of this
new center of gravity is that information and the media (propaganda), not military firepower or technology, is the primary currency upon which “modern
war amongst the people” is run.30 This political-psychological effort also defines victory or defeat. In these
terms, public opinion and political leadership provide
the architecture from which to develop a viable ends,
ways, and means strategy that can win a prolonged
multidimensional political-psychological war.
Combinations.
The two Chinese colonels who authored Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, are
adamant. They unequivocally argue that regardless of
whether a war took place 2,500 years ago or last year,
the data indicate that all victories or failures display
one common denominator—the winner is the national
power, international alliance (power bloc), or nonstate
political actor that is best organized and has implemented a combination of multidimensional efforts.31

11

The purpose of combinations is to organize a system
of offensive and defensive power that is a great force
multiplier and facilitator within the global security
arena. This system gives new and greater meaning
to the idea of a nation-state or other political actor
using all available instruments of power to protect,
maintain, and achieve perceived political and security
interests.32
The dominating characteristic of a war of this kind
is political-military, economic-commercial, or culturalmoral. Within the context of these combinations, there
is a difference between the dominant sphere and the
whole, although a dynamic relationship exists between
a dominant type of general war and the supporting elements that make up the whole. As an example, Qiao
and Wang state that conventional military war must
be strongly supported by media (propaganda/information/moral) warfare and a combination of other
types of war that might include but are not limited
to psychological war, financial war, trade war, cyber
war, diplomatic war, proxy war, narco-criminal war,
and guerrilla war.33 More specific examples of national
power combinations include the following:
•	Conventional military war/cyber war/media
war (e.g., Georgia, 2008);
•	Surrogate or proxy war/intelligence war/
media war (e.g., Lebanon, 2006);
•	Narco-criminal war/financial war/psychological/media war (e.g., Mexico, to date);
•	Guerrilla war/psychological-media war/narco-criminal war (e.g., Colombia and Peru, to
date); and,
•	Diplomatic war/media war/conventional war
(e.g., Algeria, 1954-62).
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Any one of the above combinations can be combined with others to form new methods and combinations of conflict. There are no means that cannot
be combined with others. The only limitation is the
imagination of the planner and decisionmaker. As a
consequence, politically effective contemporary warfare requires the services of civilian warriors—as
well as professional soldiers and policemen—who
can conduct persuasion-coercion-propaganda war,
insurgency war, media war, financial war, trade war,
psychological war, network (virus) war, cyber war,
chemical-biological-radiological war, etc. Professional
soldiers no longer have a monopoly on power. Accordingly, civilian warriors must be included in the
strategic architecture for contemporary warfare.34
Time as an Instrument of Statecraft.
Hugo Chavez and his disciples understand that
war is no longer limited to using military violence
to compel desired radical political-economic-social
change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear
on a given situation must be used. A 4GW leader will
tailor his actions to his adversaries’ vulnerabilities,
and to their psychological precepts.35 In these terms,
both Lenin and Mao taught that time (the long-term)
becomes one of the main instruments of contemporary
power. Prolonged war includes no place for compromise or other options short of achieving the ultimate
political objective (radical political change). Lenin
was straightforward: “Concessions are a new kind of
war.”36 Thus, time is one more instrument of statecraft.
Moreover, because the “new” asymmetric conflict is generally political-psychological, protagonists
must understand that it takes time to change peoples’

13

minds and behavior and prepare them for phased,
progressive moves toward short-and mid-term as
well as long-term objectives. As examples, Mao and
his Chinese communists fought for 28 years (1921-49);
the Vietnamese communists fought for 30 years (194575); the Nicaraguan Sandinistas fought for 18 years
(1961-79); and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso organization has claimed that it is prepared to fight 75 years
(1962-?) to achieve its revolutionary objective.37 As a
consequence, in 2005, Chavez claimed that he was
planning for a protracted 40-year struggle in which
he or other Bolivarian leadership must: 1) propagate
Latin American nationalism; 2) educate, organize, and
prepare several thousand professionals for organizational duties, combat, and governance who are prepared to lead the masses through a revolution and into
the proverbial halls of power; and, 3) create a popular
front not just of a few hundred “true believers,” but a
large number of Christians, Socialists, trade unionists,
intellectuals, students, peasants, the “debourgeoised”
middle classes, and friendly nations that will “march
together to defeat sepoyan (lackey-like) militarism
and U.S. imperialism.”38 Contrary to the teachings of
some impatient revolutionaries who still adhere to the
teachings of Che Guevara, no shortcut will work.39
Conclusions.
Hugo Chavez and his selected leadership understand that contemporary asymmetric war is not a
kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the
more comfortable conventional military attrition and
maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more.
Again, such war may be military or nonmilitary, lethal
or nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state or
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a coalition of states’ (alliance) array of instruments of
power. As such, it may be a zero-sum game in which
only one winner emerges; or, in the worst-case scenario, no winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the
“battlefield” is extended to everyone, everything, and
everywhere—over time.40
Some important things in contemporary war have
changed, but some have stayed the same. In 2005, we
summarized the concept of modern asymmetric warfare by taking a page from a Harry Potter adventure.
We called it “Wizard’s Chess.” As a metaphorical
example, we further characterized Hugo Chavez as
a “Master” of this deadly game. The analogy is still
instructive and sobering:
In that game, protagonists move pieces silently and
subtly all over the game board. Under the players’ studied direction, each piece represents a different type of
direct and indirect power and might simultaneously
conduct its lethal and non-lethal attacks from differing directions. Each piece shows no mercy against its
foe and is prepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow
another piece the opportunity to destroy or control an
opponent—or to checkmate the king. Over the longterm, however, this game is not a test of expertise in
creating instability, conducting violence, or achieving
some sort of moral satisfaction. Ultimately, it is an exercise in survival. A player’s failure in Wizard’s Chess
is death, and is not an option.41

The reality of this kind of “game” is grand strategic and epochal in scale, and ultimately witnesses
the transition from one dominant political form to
another. Politicized militias, hegemonic nonstate entities, and surrogates for traditional nation-states will
likely move from war with some rules and conventions to new warmaking entities and into completely
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unrestricted warfare. Failing and failed states will
possibly evolve into new and undesirable state forms
such as rogue states, criminal states, draconian states
(military dictatorships), neo-populist states (civilian
dictatorships), or new “People’s Republics.” Failing
or failed states may also dissolve and become parts of
other states, or may be configured into entirely new
entities.42 In short, revolution is not an event; it is a
process.
This takes us back to where we began. Hugo
Chavez understands the sophistication and complexity of combinations of national instruments of power
and alliances, and war as a whole. He also understands
the value of facilitating the processes of state failure
to achieve his objectives of establishing 21st-Century
Socialism and Latin American grandeza (greatness).
Chavez and his supporters understand the importance of dreams about survival and a better life for
much of any given population. These are the bases of
power—all else is illusion.
THE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONAL MODEL
Paramilitary operations to enable the three-front
asymmetric war focus on: 1) six phases of varying
levels of agi-prop activities; 2) the destabilization of
the bourgeois enemy until his resolve is gone and the
targeted country has reached failing or failed-state
status; and, 3) generating a force multiplier by building alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. Abraham
Guillen, one of Chavez’s intellectual mentors, argued
that these “political-[psychological]-moral factors are
more decisive for victory than heavy armament and
ironclad units.”43
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Six Phases that Elaborate “New” Roles of the
Bolivarian Popular Militias.
General Gustavo Reyes Rangel Briceno articulated
the six operational military/paramilitary phases of the
program for the “liberation” of Latin America at his
Change of Office Speech as Minister of Defense for the
National Reserve and National Mobilization to take
the higher post of Minister of [National] Defense. This
speech, made on July 18, 2007, provided a 4GW asymmetric model to assist thinking about, planning, and
implementing the Bolivarian dream. Accordingly, the
general’s speech might well have been written by Lenin, Abraham Guillen, or a younger Leninist mentor,
Jorge Verstrynge.44 Another aspect of the speech was
quite clear. It was NOT written by a military officer
steeped in the tradition of 3rd Generation Maneuver
and Attrition War. It was NOT written by someone
who was preparing his students or staff for an impossible war on the European or North American plains
against hypothetical red-colored enemies who look,
strangely, like Russian Combined Arms Armies. It
was NOT written by someone whose purpose was to
prepare his students or staff to fight the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. General Briceno’s speech, with its
“new” phases, reflected “new” battlefields, “new” enemies, “new” forms of attack and defense, and “new”
threats that are relevant to modern asymmetric wars
of national resistance (strategic defense). Lastly, General Briceno’s Change of Office Speech was written by
an officer who was NOT looking for anything tangible.
He was seeking the realization of a dream—the liberation of Latin America from the U.S. political-economic
hegemon—a Marxian reward of history.45
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Phase One: Destabilization of targeted societies
through the exploitation of a combination of four types
of war working within the context of the general war
of resistance: 1) temporal (prolonged) war; 2) creating
chaos and instability (governance war); 3) economic
(finance and trade) war; and, 4) media (information/
propaganda) war.
Phase Two: Create a popular (political) front out
of the debourgeoised middle classes and other likeminded individuals to compete with and weaken
a targeted government. The intent is to politically
and psychologically support the four wars noted in
Phase One.
Phase Three: Foment regional conflicts. This would
involve covert, gradual, and preparatory politicalpsychological-military activities (“seeding operations”) in developing and nurturing popular support
for the war of resistance. The fomentation of regional
conflicts over time would also involve the establishment and defense of “liberated zones” (quasi-states)
within the state.
Phase Four: Plan and implement overt and direct
intimidation activities, including popular actions
(such as demonstrations, strikes, civic violence, personal violence, maiming, and murder) against feudal,
capitalistic, militaristic opponents in particular and
against yanqui imperialism in general. The intent is to
debilitate targeted states and weaken bourgeois military command and control facilities.
Phase Five: Increase covert and overt politicalpsychological-economic-military actions directed at
developing local popular militias to fight in their own
zones, provincial or district militias to fight in their
particular areas, and a larger military organization to
fight in all parts of the targeted country with the cooperation of local and district militias.
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Phase Six: Directly, but gradually, confront a demoralized enemy military force and bring about its
desired collapse—or militarily invade a failing or
failed state. The objective in either case would be to
impose (compel) appropriate 21st-century socialist
governance.46
Additionally, until the last moment in the third
and decisive phase of the Latin American liberation
process—when a targeted government is about to collapse—every action is preparatory work and not expected to provoke great concern from the enemy or its
bourgeois allies. Only at the point of enemy collapse
and the radical imposition of New Socialist governance will the people begin to enjoy the benefits of
love, happiness, peace, and well-being.47
If this dream were to come true, Hugo Chavez or a
successor would witness the metamorphosis of 15 or
20 Latin American republics into one great American
nation. Experience demonstrates, however, that most
political dreams very seldom come true (think of the
40+ years of Socialism in Eastern Europe, 1945-89). Ultimately, the international community must pay the
direct and indirect social, economic, and political costs
of state failure. As a consequence, the current threat
environment in the Western Hemisphere is not a traditional security problem, but it is no less dangerous.48
Operationalizing a “New” Paramilitary Mission—
Facilitating the Processes of State Failure.
Like revolution, state failure is a process, not an
outcome. Contemporary 4GW asymmetric destabilization threats to personal and collective security
and well-being are not necessarily direct attacks on
a government. They are, however, proven means for
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weakening governing regimes. These indirect threats
reflect a logical progression from the problems of institutional and state weaknesses to the partial collapse
of the state, and, finally, to state failure. The process
is brought on by poor, irresponsible, and/or insensitive governance and leads to one other fundamental
reason states fail. That is, state failure can be a process
exacerbated either by nonstate groups or nation-states
(e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal organizations
and their enforcer gangs, and/or civil or military or
paramilitary organizations operating directly on behalf of a nation-state or indirectly as a proxy (surrogate). The general intent is to depose an established
government or exercise illicit control over a targeted
country. Destabilizing actions perpetrated by nonstate groups (including proxies) or state authorities
weaken government and its institutions, and regimes
become progressively less capable of performing the
fundamental security and well-being tasks of responsible governance.49
More specifically, the state failure process tends to
move from personal violence to increased collective
violence and social disorder to kidnappings, bank
robberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption, criminal anarchy, and internal and external population displacements. In turn, the momentum of this process of
violence tends to evolve into more widespread social
violence, serious degradation of the economy, and
diminished governmental capability to provide personal and collective security and guarantee the rule
of law to all citizens. Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, an irregular political actor or nonstate group can quietly and subtly
co-opt politicians, bureaucrats, and security person-
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nel to gain political control of a given piece of the national territory. The individual or nonstate group that
takes control of a series of networked pieces of such
“ungoverned territory” can then become a dominant
political actor (e.g., warlord) and control a quasi-state
within a state.50
Somewhere near the end of the destabilization
process, the state will be able to control less and less
of its national territory and fewer and fewer of the
people in it. The diminishment of responsible governance and citizen security generates greater poverty,
violence, and instability—and a downward spiral in
terms of socioeconomic development and well-being.
It is a zero-sum game in which state, nonstate, or individual actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal
organizations, corrupt public officials, and hegemonic
states) are the winners, and the rest of a targeted society are losers. Unless and until a society perceives that
its government deals with issues of personal security,
well-being, and socioeconomic development fairly and
effectively, the potential for internal or external forces
to destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable.
Regimes that ignore this lesson often find themselves
in a “crisis of governance.” They face increasing social
violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, and
overthrow. This process has been known to lead to
the violent imposition of a radical political-economicsocial restructuring of the state and its governance
in accordance with the values—good, bad, or nonexistent—of the best organized and most-disciplined
group left standing.
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Another “New” Force Multiplier—Alliances,
Partnerships, and Coalitions.
These are agreements among states or nonstate actors to: 1) coordinate behavior in the event of political-economic-social-military emergencies; 2) increase
empirical power in the international security arena; 3)
counterbalance threats posed by potential aggressors
in the anarchical global security environment; and,
4) support coercive diplomacy. Thus, alliances, partnerships, and coalitions have operated in the security
arena for thousands of years, and really are not “new”
instruments of statecraft. Their primary rule and purpose, forever, has been and is to protect, maintain,
and/or enhance one’s own interests.51
These tenets define a part of Hugo Chavez’s “New
Strategic Map for the Exportation of the Bolivarian
Revolution.” That part of his “map” is entitled “Stimulating the New Multipolar System.” The rationale for
this is that “the United States will continue to increase
its interventionist, aggressive, genocidal, and savage policies regarding the Americas. Thus, we must
prepare ourselves to deal with and overcome these
hegemonic issues. We must work hard, very hard, to
prevail over the United States and extend the revolution to the rest of the Latin American region.”52 Accordingly, Chavez has brought together an unlikely
assortment of state and nonstate actors, and criminalterrorist organizations for these purposes. They are:
1) the Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuala, which
includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and,
possibly, Argentina; 2) Iran and Russia; and, 3) at the
very least, this alliance offers material and political
support to the insurgent and drug trafficking Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Ira-
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nian surrogate and terrorist Hezbollah operations in
the Western Hemisphere, and other violent nonstate
actors such as African and Mexican Transnational
Criminal Organizations (TCOs). Thus, this group of
partners (allies) comprises a hybrid of state, nonstate,
and criminal-terrorist franchises that appear to be
expanding as this monograph is being written. The one
thing this diverse group of parties has in common is
a hatred for the West in general and the United States
in particular.53
Alliance Enablers for the Exportation of Instability.
The operationalization of Chavez’s “New Strategic
Map for the Exportation of the Bolivarian Revolution”
appears to be based on three mutually supporting alliance activities: 1) Combating International Isolation;
2) Increasing Economic Activism; and, 3) Increasing
Paramilitary and Conventional Military Presence in
the Hemisphere. Chavez and his disciples expect these
4GW alliance activities to lead to the destabilization of
their bourgeois enemies. The “new” Socialist reasoning is quite realistic. “Adopting alliances is vital for
the integration of Latin America because it is impossible for the United States [or anyone else] to use its
vast conventional military force against them.”54
Combating International Isolation. Alliances provide
Venezuela with powerful friends both outside and inside the Western Hemisphere. The major allies have
been noted above. Unofficial extra-hemispheric actors, in addition to Iran and Russia, would probably
include China, Chinese Triads, African gangs and cartels, the Spanish Basque separatist organization (ETA),
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and various Islamic
groups sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
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States to include al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.55 A
new element in the current configuration of forces in
Latin America is that criminalizing states frequently
use TCOs (cartels) as a form of statecraft. They bring
these elements into areas of weak or no state sovereignty, and the TCOs and their enforcer gangs provide alternative (criminal) governance systems (quasistates). Strategically, this alters the structure of global
order and makes a lie of de facto or de jure sovereignty.
This threat is operationalized by the illicit movement
of goods (e.g., drugs, money, weapons systems, and
human beings), and the billions of dollars that these
illicit activities generate. The influence and corruption
that this money buys is rotting fragile (failing) states.56
Such a relationship between state and nonstate actors provides numerous short- to mid-term benefits to
both parties. As one example, the FARC (Colombia’s
major insurgent and drug-trafficking organization)
gains access to Venezuelan territory and routes for
exporting cocaine to Africa, Europe, and the United
States. The FARC uses the same territory and routes
to import weapons systems, communications equipment, training, and money. In this way, the Venezuelan government exerts indirect military pressure and
related destabilization efforts on its most dangerous
neighbor—Colombia. Additionally, the Venezuelan
government enhances its international revolutionary credentials in the radical axis composed of leftist
populists and Islamic fundamentalists. It is also able
to profit from this illicit trade at a time when oil revenues are relatively low and the national budget is
under significant stress. Given the enormous revenue
stream that illicit Venezuelan-Colombian TCO trade
represents, it is not likely that this alliance will go
away soon.57
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Clearly, the Venezuelan state and its criminalinsurgent-terrorist partners will continue to leverage
their relationships to mutual benefit. But a cautionary note is required here. Over the long term, TCOs
and criminal-insurgent networks have proven to be
resilient and highly adaptable. This gives these kinds
of actors an asymmetric advantage over partner state
actors, which are inherently more bureaucratic, slow
moving, and less adaptable than nonstate groups. At
the same time, governments have also consistently
underestimated the capabilities of more efficient
nonhierarchical organizations. Those organizational
advantages can generate a possible national security
and sovereignty threat to the Venezuelan state in that
national security and sovereignty are being impinged
every day, and the illicit commercial motives of TCOs
and other nonstate actors have been known to become
a subtle and ominous political agenda. In short, the
common putative objective of these hybrid horizontally organized nonstate groups is to control people,
territory, and government to ensure their own freedom of movement and action within a given national
territory (i.e., effective sovereignty).58
Increasing Economic Activity. At base, increasing
economic activity is a continuation from the more fundamental alliance activity we call Combating International Isolation. Economic cooperation, as a result, has
emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between
Iran and the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and serves
at least three clear purposes.
First, it allows Iran to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by the United States, the European
Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) through
access to the Venezuelan financial system. As a consequence, Iran’s partnership with Venezuela effectively
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provides an ancillary avenue from which it can access
the international financial system, despite Western
pressures. Second, this financial access facilitates the
funding and support of radical populist and socialist parties and violent nonstate actors throughout the
Hemisphere. Third, Iran has increased its economic
investment in several areas (e.g., industry, mining,
transportation, energy, and technical assistance).
Many of Iran’s contracts with various countries in Latin America have not yet come to fruition. The exception, however, is Venezuela, where substantial Iranian
investments have been made. As a matter of fact, Iranian economic investment in Venezuela has expanded
from virtually nothing in 2007 to a not insignificant
$40 billion today.59
Even though much of the promised Iranian economic investment in the Hemisphere has not materialized, that country is in the process of creating an
extensive regional network of diplomatic, economic,
industrial, and commercial activities. Thus, probably
the most dangerous threat to the United States from
Venezuela results from its facilitation and encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere
by Iran and its principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has established a major regional presence
throughout the Americas and is involved in a range of
illicit activities, from drug trafficking, to money laundering, to training Venezuelan and other paramilitary
forces.60
In this connection, coercive state and violent nonstate actors are serious impediments to growth, and
major instruments for corrupting, distorting, and
damaging stability in Latin America. The TCO-enforcer gang-insurgent-state nexus represents a triple
threat to the authority and sovereignty of a host gov-
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ernment as well as an enemy regime. First, murder,
kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and impunity
undermine the ability of the state to perform its legitimizing security and public service functions. Second,
by coercive imposition of power over bureaucrats and
elected officials of the state, TCOs and their allies compromise the exercise of legitimate state authority and
real democracy. Third, and closely related, by taking
control of portions of a given national territory and
performing at least some of the tasks of effective sovereign governance, the TCO phenomenon transforms
itself de facto into states within the state, and criminal
leaders govern as they wish. Thus, the hybrid TCOstate phenomenon contributes significantly to the erosion of democracy and to the evolutionary state failure
process.61
Military-Paramilitary Presence in the Latin American Region. Military-Paramilitary presence builds on
the previous two closely related elements of Hugo
Chavez’s “New Strategic Map for the Exportation of
the Bolivarian Revolution” These actions facilitate serious regional instability through significant military
equipment and arms purchases and training. They
support extremists and various “liberation movements” in the Hemisphere and “generate economic
production, influence, and angst.”62 In a world where
public opinion is crucial, economic production, influence, and angst keep bourgeois enemies off balance
and are great facilitators of long-term success (i.e., destabilization).
Military, paramilitary, and intelligence information is always among the murkiest areas of concern
in global security politics. But even if complete and
accurate information is not available, these issues cannot be prudently ignored. After all, governments do
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not invest long-term resources in pursuit of ephemeral or insubstantial aims. In that connection, Venezuela has submitted two reports to the UN Register of
Conventional Arms (UNROCA), one in 1997 and the
other in 2002. Both were nil. At the same time, even
though Venezuela ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Transparency Convention in 2005,
it has never submitted a report. This was because of
military secrecy laws; the 1999 Constitution gives
the President of the Republic the right to classify and
control disclosure of matters directly relating to the
planning and execution of operations concerning national security. Additionally, in 2009, the National Assembly approved a law to maintain the confidentiality
of military agreements between Venezuela and other
states.63 As a consequence, Venezuela has provided no
information on weapons transfers from Russia either
to UNROCA or the OAS. However, in 2012, Russia reported to the UNROCA that it had delivered 24 combat aircraft, 44 attack helicopters, and 2,272 missiles
and missile launchers to Venezuela.64
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly and Jane’s International Defense Review report a good deal more. They state that
Venezuela and Russia have signed agreements for
arms and training over the period from 2004 to 2010
that amount to $11 billion. During that time, Venezuela received 24 Su-30MKV multirole fighters, 92 T-72
tanks, 57 transport and assault Mi-17/26/-35 helicopters, 25 CATIC K-8WB lead-in fighter trainers, four
Damen Stan Lander 5612 transport ships, and two Stan
Patrol 2602 coastal patrol craft. Other programs, coming to $4 billion, provide additional patrol vessels, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and BMP-3 infantry
fighting vehicles. Additionally, Russia is supplying 24
BM-21 122 mm and 12 Smerch 300 mm multiple rocket
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launchers, 48 Sanyi 120 mm self-propelled mortars, 48
MSTA-S 152 mm self-propelled howitzers, and BukM2E mobile air defense systems. Lastly, more arms,
long-range mobile radars, air defense systems, and
electronic warfare centers are expected to be delivered
in 2012.65
Accordingly, it is being reported that Russia is
trying to regain the influential position it enjoyed in
the 1970s and early-1980s in Latin America. At the
same time, Russia is repaying Venezuela for its diplomatic recognition of the independence of Georgia’s
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.66
Whether or not these assertions can be proved is not
as important as the fact that the reports of Venezuelan acquisition of these arms and weapons systems
are destabilizing the military balance and causing a
great deal of “angst” in Colombia, Guyana, and a few
other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
regions.67
Russia, however, is not the only Venezuelan ally
that maintains a military or paramilitary presence
in Latin America. In addition to supporting Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and the Colombian FARC, the
Iranian Quds force (the elite paramilitary unit of the
Revolutionary Guards) has also placed operatives and
trainers in embassies, charities, and Islamic religious
and cultural institutions in the Hemisphere. The presumed intent is to enhance socioeconomic ties with the
already well-established Shia Diaspora in the region,
to collect intelligence and support extremists, and to
help destabilize unfriendly regimes. Quds is also reportedly conducting training and support operations
in Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela.68 The organization
that has reportedly received the most financial, arms,
and training support from Quds is the Colombian
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FARC and its political arm—the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB). In addition to its politicalpsychological missions, the CCB maintains what some
have called a “Foreign Legion.”69 Not surprisingly,
the mission of the CCB Foreign Legion is to carry out
paramilitary operations to support extremists and
nascent and long-standing insurgent groups and to
help destabilize bourgeois regimes. Consequently, the
CCB is reported to be active in, at the least, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and
Paraguay.70
Conclusions.
Some argue that all these agi-prop (agitation-propaganda) efforts aimed at the destabilization of bourgeois enemies and the organization of alliance activities are merely political theater. They are absolutely
right. What they do not understand, however, is that
4th Generation Asymmetric Warfare is directed at influencing an unconventional center of gravity—that
is, public opinion and leadership. As a consequence,
it is important to understand that Hugo Chavez’s
Bolivarian Revolution is indeed political theater. It is
intended to create political-economic-social disequilibrium, the weakening of an enemy state, and radical change over the long term. Accordingly, transition
is grand strategic and epochal in scale. It ultimately
witnesses change from the supposed misery of liberal
democracy and capitalism to the promised love and
harmony of “New Socialism.”71
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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In The Sling and the Stone, Colonel T. X. Hammes,
USMC (Ret.), argues that “Just as the world has evolved
from an industrial society to an information-based society, so has warfare.”72 4GW does not attempt to win
wars by defeating an enemy’s military forces. Both
the epic, decisive Napoleonic battle (2nd Generation
War), and the wide-ranging, high-tech, high-speed
maneuver campaign (3rd Generation War—“Shock
and Awe”) are irrelevant. 4GW is an evolved form
of insurgency rooted in the fundamental precept that
superior political will, when properly employed, can
defeat greater military and economic power. It uses
all available networks—political, economic, social, informational, and military—to convince the enemy decisionmakers that their goals are either unachievable
or too costly to justify the perceived benefits. Using its
networks, 4GW directly attacks the minds of enemy
populations, policymakers, and decisionmakers to destroy their political will.73
These are the principal characteristics of what
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has called “4th
Generation War,” “Guerra de todo el pueblo (“War
of all the People,” “Peoples’ War,” or “War Among
Peoples”). He asserts that this type of conflict has virtually unlimited possibilities for a “Super Insurgency”
intended to bring about fundamental political-economic-social change in the Western Hemisphere.74 The
urgency and importance of the 4GW threat have generated four related themes. First, several countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean are paradigms of the
failing state and have enormous implications for the
stability, development, democracy, prosperity, and
peace of the entire Western Hemisphere. Second, the
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transnational drug and arms trafficking, paramilitary,
insurgent, and gang organizations in Mexico, Central
and South America, and the Caribbean Basin are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human
horror, and internal instability that, if left unchecked
at the strategic level, can ultimately threaten the collapse of various states and undermine the security
and sovereignty of neighbors. Third, poverty, social
exclusion, environmental degradation, and politicaleconomic-social expectations—and the conflicts generated by these indirect and implicit threats to stability
and human well-being—lead to further degeneration
of citizen security. Fourth, these threats also constitute
a serious challenge of U.S. national security, well-being, and position in the global community.
The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations described above is straightforward.
The contemporary, chaotic global strategic environment reflects a general lack of legitimate governance
and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the
world. Instability thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy are
the general consequences of unreformed political, social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant misguided or poor governance. Ultimately, this
instability, and the human, nonstate, and state destabilizers who exploit it, lead to a final downward spiral
into failing and failed-state status. Again, it must be
remembered that, as important as instability might
be, it is only a symptom—not the threat itself. Again,
the ultimate threat is the issue nobody wants to deal
with—state failure.
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The novelist John le Carré succinctly defines a failing or failed state in stark terms:
I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly,
the qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—
electoral suffrage . . . protection of life and property .
. . justice, health and education for all . . . the maintenance of a sound administrative structure—and roads,
transport, drains, etcetera—and—what else is there?—
ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails
to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then one
has to say that the contract between state and citizen
begins to look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of
the above, then it’s a failed state . . . an unstate . . . an
ex-state.”75

The logic of the state failure situation demonstrates
that the conscious choices that the international community and individual nation-states make about how
to deal with this type of unconventional threat will
define the processes of national, regional, and global
security and well-being for now and into the future.
This cautionary tale reminds us that protracted asymmetric war (4GW) is the only kind of conflict that a
modern power has ever lost. It is surprising and
dismaying that the world’s only superpower does
not have a unified long-term strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational architecture to
deal with Chavez’s 21st-Century Socialism and its associated asymmetric war.76 It would appear that this
epochal transitional threat is being dismissed as too
difficult, too ambiguous, and too far into the future
to deal with. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that it
is time to take the empirical evidence seriously and
make substantive political-economic, social, informational, and military changes to deal effectively with
the threat that one dare not speak its name.77
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The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms
with the pressing need to shift from a singular operational-tactical military-police approach to a multidimensional and multinational paradigm. That, in turn,
requires a strategic-level conceptual framework and
a supporting organizational structure to promulgate
unified civil-military planning and the implementation of transnational responses to transnational threats.
These efforts must be organized as a network rather
than in the traditional vertical, top-down bureaucracies of most governments. Accomplishing such efforts
will also require fundamental changes in how government leaders and personnel at all levels are employed,
trained, developed, and promoted. Additionally, and
most importantly, this interagency and multilateral
process must exert its collective influence for the entire duration of a conflict—from the initial planning to
the final achievement (or compulsion) of a sustainable
peace. Remember, it is the last man standing—regardless of how badly beaten he might be—who is the winner in this type of conflict.
Recommendations.
Long lists of recommendations and measures of effectiveness will be irrelevant if the strategic-level conceptual and architectural foundational requirements
are not implemented first. One of Carl von Clausewitz’s translators, Michael Howard, warned us years
ago, “If [the political-psychological struggle] is not
conducted with skill and based on realistic analysis
. . . no amount of operational expertise, logistical backup, or technology could possibly help.”78 Nevertheless,
there are a few high-level recommendations the U.S.
Army could propose, and some more intermediatelevel recommendations it could implement.
34

• High-Level Recommendations:
— The Army could recommend a permanent
interagency end-state planning capability.
This capability should include transnational coordination and cooperation.
— The Army could recommend an updated
executive-legislative understanding of the
purpose of U.S. security and guidelines
for amendments to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, in accordance with the new
requirements of the nonkinetic tools of
statecraft.
— The Army could help plan and implement
indirect and direct actions against belligerent and politicized nonstate actors using
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians
with appropriate political-cultural literacy
and language skills.
— A
 t the least, the Army could develop a design for using conventional armed forces in
nontraditional roles mandated by the new
sociology of deliberate conflict outlined
above in Chavez’s Asymmetric Warfare
Model, and the Paramilitary Operational
Model for Compelling Radical Change.
The Army could also develop a design for
conflict based on the Chavez/Venezuelan
model that is also being inadvertently used
by belligerent and politicized non-state
actors.79 Such a redefinition of mission, organization, and training would be useful
in informing military reform debates in
Latin America and elsewhere that still cling
to the Westphalian model of sovereignty
and warfare.80
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•	Intermediate-Level Recommendations for
Leader Development and Professional Military
Education:
— The study of the fundamental nature of
conflict has always been the philosophical
cornerstone for comprehending the essence
of traditional conflict. It is no less relevant to
unconventional war.
— Leaders at all levels must understand the
strategic and political implications of tactical and operational-level actions. They must
also understand the ways that military force
can be employed to achieve political and
psychological ends and understand and accept the ways that political considerations
affect the use of force.
— Leaders must acquire the ability to interact
collegially and effectively with U.S. civilian
agencies, representatives of international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local and global news media,
and civilian populations.
— Leaders must understand that information
and intelligence, and psychological and
public diplomacy activities, are force multipliers. Professional military education and
leader development must foster the concept
that commanders at all levels have to take
responsibility for collecting and managing
human intelligence and conducting public
diplomacy efforts for their own use. Also,
they must understand the penalties that
are paid when these instrument of power
are ignored.
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— L
 astly, education and training for contemporary unconventional conflict must
prepare military personnel to be effective
war-fighters. Additionally, because of the
highly charged political-psychological environment in which military personnel
must now work, combatants must also
display political-cultural sensitivity, considerable restraint, and strong discipline.
Again, combatants must understand the
price they will pay if a population should
become alienated.81
•	Lastly, the above recommendations can, inter
alia, provide the bases for policy direction for:
— Security cooperation and building partnership capability.
— Strategic communications in terms of exchanging key messages or themes on a host
of mutually important topics.
— Institutional and professional development
between the U.S. Army and its international
partners.
— Enhancing personnel exchange programs
and political-cultural-language skills.
— Criminal-Transnational Criminal Organizations (C-TCO) training to improve professional competence of partner armies, while
at the same time following the rule of law
and the human rights of their citizens.82
Difficult as these recommendations may be to implement, they are far less demanding and costly in political, military, and monetary terms than the conven-
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tional approach. The author of The Sling and the Stone
reminds us that allowing the age-old “business as
usual” and “crisis management” approaches to work
at cross-purposes with the reality of contemporary
unconventional asymmetric conflict is a sure formula
for failure in generating global stability and security.83
However, a final cautionary note is in order. The U.S.
Army and other U.S. military forces must educate,
organize, equip, and train to deal with an unpredictable enemy. Thus, the study of chaos, ambiguity, complexity, and flexibility must be essential elements in
the education and development of strategic leaders.
The most likely situation to arise in unconventional
asymmetric conflict is that it might not be foreseen or
planned for.84
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